How will free trade affect monetary policy and exchange rate regime choices in the Americas?
1 Do regional trade agreements (RTAs) encourage monetary and exchange rate cooperation among the participating countries? There is certainly a heated debate about whether they should; unfortunately, theoretical analyses of policy choice do not provide an unambiguous answer to the question. 1 Neither does past experience offer much guidance.
On the one hand there is Europe, where the creation of a free trade area and a customs union was followed by a succession of measures to stabilize exchange rates and coordinate monetary policies in what many observers characterize as the successive stages of a single process. On the other hand there is North America, where the completion of a free trade area nearly a decade ago has not created noticeable impetus for exchange rate stabilization and monetary cooperation. It has not promoted serious discussion of a single North American currency, the recommendations of a few far-seeing academic visionaries to the contrary notwithstanding. 2 These contrasting examples suggest that RTAs can have different consequences for monetary institutions and exchange rate arrangements depending on context and circumstances in which they are established. The question for present purposes is which context and circumstances matter. In this paper we seek to draw out the answer and to apply it to understanding the monetary and exchange rate consequences of a Free Trade Area of the Americas.
Part of that context, clearly, is political. In Europe, economic and monetary integration was envisaged from the start as part of the process of building an "ever closer Europe," entailing not just a customs union but also a single market and not just the closer coordination of national policies but also the creation of supra-national policymaking institutions. Europe's readiness to move from a customs union to a single market, in which regulatory policies are harmonized and governance is shared, altered the costs and benefits of national monetary autonomy, making monetary independence less desirable and increasing the attractiveness of exchange rate stabilization and monetary unification. 3 A willingness to create supra-national policy-making institutions like the European Commission and the European Central Bank and to convene a constitutional convention charged with creating a regional political structure through which those institutions can be held accountable have further enhanced the efficiency and legitimacy of supra-national policy making. Thus, politics shaped the monetary consequences of Europe's single market by opening up institution-building options that are not obviously available in other regions. If commercial integration created a desire for monetary integration, which in turn ratcheted up the pressure for political integration as a way of ensuring the accountability of the institutions responsible for the common monetary policy (deepening and widening regional integration through a dynamic that political scientists refer to as "neofunctionalist spillovers"), then this was something to be encouraged, not resisted.
In North America, in contrast, there is little desire for political integration. 4 The three nations participating in the North American Free Trade Agreement are jealous of their sovereignty. There is no discussion of a North American equivalent of the European Parliament to whom a regional central bank would be accountable. Hence, there is little willingness to contemplate a single currency for NATFA, since the monetary authority charged with its management would not be regarded as politically legitimate, given its lack of accountability. 5 At the same time, there has been surprisingly little pressure (surprising, at least, when seen from a European perspective) to stabilize exchange rates, coordinate monetary policies, and discuss monetary unification. If anything, the three North American currencies, and the Mexican peso in particular, have been floating more freely since the negotiation of NAFTA than before.
Part of the context is also economic. In Europe, commercial integration led to a sharp expansion in the volume of intra-regional trade. 6 Because Europe's free trade area is of long standing, there has been an opportunity for trade and production to adjust. 7 Moreover, there is the feeling (not overwhelmingly supported by evidence) that exchange rate volatility has a depressing effect on trade. Consequently, the stimulus to the volume of trade from the creation of Europe's customs union and single market augmented the numbers of those who saw exchange rate stability as in their economic self-interest and lobbied accordingly (Frieden 1996). 8 There is also the fear that exchange rate fluctuations can produce misalignments that create an arbitrary and capricious competitive advantage for the country with the undervalued currency and a political backlash against free trade in the partner consequently experiencing an import surge. 9 Because the expansion of trade associated 5 And, similarly, there is reluctance on the part of Canada and Mexico to contemplate the option of seats on an expanded Federal Reserve Board, since there would still be no mechanism through which the members of the Board could be held accountable to the Canadian and Mexican polities. Buiter (1999) discusses the possibility of a supranational monetary policy committee with representatives from all three countries. He notes that absent the regional equivalent of the European Parliament, the Canadian parliament would be able to call only its own national representative(s) to account. The non-Canadian majority on the committee would presumably be under no obligation to respond to questions from Canada's elected or appointed officials. 6 See for example the evidence in Eichengreen and Bayoumi (1997a) . 7 Because commercial integration has extended from a free trade area to a customs union and a single market, the pressure for adjustment has been particularly strong. 8 Further empirical support for this regularity, drawn from Latin American data, is Frieden, Ghezzi and Stein (2000) . 9 For an analysis in the context of Argentine-Brazilian relations in the wake of the 1999 devaluation of the real, see Rozemberg and Svarzman (2002) . Fenandez-Arias, Panizza, and Stein (2002) suggest that to the extent that an RTA allows members to export to their partners goods that are not competitive on with the regional arrangement augments the ranks of those who benefit from cross-border transactions, it amplifies calls for exchange rate stabilization and monetary coordination to contain the potential for a political backlash against that expansion. 10
In North America, in contrast, the adjustment of trade and production is still underway, since NAFTA is less than a decade old. And, there are few special agreements, like the Common Agricultural Policy, that might be jeopardized by currency fluctuations. 11 In addition, it can be argued that trade and production are organized vertically in North America, in contrast to Europe, where they are organized horizontally.
Because French and German firms producing the same products compete head to head, small exchange rate changes can have big consequences for exports and profitability. In contrast, U.S. and Mexican companies specialize in different products and different stages of the production process. Mexican producers provide inputs and assembly operations for manufactures designed and marketed in the United States. To the extent that producers in the two countries specialize in different stages of the production process, they are less likely to compete head to head, and each country will be less likely to lose business to the other as a result of exchange rate fluctuations. 12 If the contrast between Europe and North America offers little clear guidance as to the prospects for monetary cooperation in an FTAA, recent experience in South international markets, leaving no outlet for them when the partner currency depreciates, such tensions will be larger still. They provide evidence that this is a problem in practice. 10 This assumes, of course, that regional arrangements are necessarily trade creating, or at least that they stimulate trade within the RTA more than they stimulate trade with the rest of the world. As an empirical matter it is not obvious that this is an accurate assumption; we will have more to say about it below. 11 While economists would question the wisdom of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), it was, for better or worse, one of the European Community's first concrete economic achievements. Its structure, which created separate floors, in terms of domestic currency, for agricultural prices in each member state, meant that exchange rate fluctuations could wreak havoc with its operation by greatly strengthening the incentives for cross border arbitrage (Giavazzi and Giovannini 1989) . 12 The vertical-versus-horizontal structure of trade is clearly not the only factor shaping the competitive impact of bilateral exchange-rate fluctuations. Fernandez-Arias, Panizza, and Stein (2002) focus on the degree of protection in the RTA partner producing the final good, suggesting that when exports are destined mainly for a highly protected RTA partner there may be little scope for reallocating them to third markets in the event of a depreciation.
America confuses the picture further. The continent's most significant trade agreement, Mercosur, has been blessed with even less monetary cooperation than NAFTA. After Brazil's real was devalued in 1999, the Argentine economy came under pressure, and then in 2001 the dramatic collapse of Argentine convertibility has seen the real exchange rate see-saw once again. Paraguay and Uruguay, the smaller countries in the compact, have been buffeted repeatedly by these shocks emanating from their larger neighbors.
Free trade has been all but lost in an increasingly complex web of exemptions adopted in response to this turbulence. The fallout from this monetary turbulence has led some to ask whether Mercosur is now a trade treaty in name only. Implicit in these observations is a series of questions. Why does the monetary experience of RTAs span such a wide spectrum? Why is Mercosur located at one end?
Where should we place other RTAs, not only the EU, NAFTA and Mercosur but also ASEAN's free trade area (AFTA) and the Australia-New Zealand agreement (ANZCER)? Finally, can this analytical mapping help us understand what lies ahead for the FTAA?
In this paper we seek to understand the implications of RTAs for the monetary and exchange rate arrangements of the participating countries. In addition to thinking about the composition and behavior of an FTAA, which is still a hypothetical construct, we pay special attention to the constituents of such an arrangement, in particular the NAFTA and Mercosur countries. We build on the theory of optimum currency areas, augmented to include a role for regionalism, to derive a model of the determinants of exchange rate outcomes.
Following Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997b) , we focus on the determinants of bilateral exchange rate volatility. In this framework, the volatility of the exchange rate between two currencies is a function of bilateral trade, economic openness, economic size, and the syncronicity of business cycles, as suggested by the theory of optimum currency areas. 13 An RTA can thus affect observed exchange rate behavior through two channels. One is the trade channel: by stimulating more trade between the partners, an RTA should increase the benefits of stable exchange rates, while augmenting the numbers supporting currency stabilization to facilitate yet additional cross-border transactions. The other is the political channel: participation in an RTA may create other political pressures for currency stabilization. 14 A problem with applying the theory of optimum currency areas to Latin America is that finance may be more important than trade for explaining exchange rate fluctuations. OCA theory focuses on the implications for the exchange rate of the current account, on how exchange rate volatility affects trade and debt-service flows and in turn is it affected by them. Latin American exchange rates are arguably more strongly affected by the capital account -by financial flows rather than trade flows. This makes it important to extend our framework to take into account the financial characteristics and vulnerabilities of RTA participants and to be certain that our conclusions still hold.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the empirical framework and data. Section 3 reports the results. Section 4 draws out the implications of our findings for the monetary consequences of a Free Trade Area of the Americas. 13 There have been a variety of extensions of this approach, for example Devereux and Lane (2001) . 14 Or, conceivably, against, as we shall see below.
Empirical Framework and Data
The theory of optimum currency areas focuses on factors that make stable exchange rates and harmonized monetary policies more or less desirable across regions and countries. 15 Among the country characteristics at the center of this analysis are (1) asymmetric business cycle disturbances, (2) the extent of trade among the countries concerned, (3) the transactions costs associated with the maintenance of separate national currencies, (4) the degree of labor mobility, and (5) the automatic stabilizers provided by federal governments. The last two of these characteristics are important for adjustment among regions within a country but are less obviously relevant when we consider adjustment between countries. Consequently, we focus in what follows on the first three items on this list.
We measure asymmetric disturbances as the standard deviation of the change in the log of relative output in the two countries (sdg). For two countries whose business cycles are relatively symmetric, the value of this measure will be small. We measure the importance of bilateral trade linkages by the average value of exports to the partner country, scaled by GDP, for the two countries concerned (ltrade). We measure the transactions costs associated with the maintenance of a national currency by the size of the countries, the argument being that small countries benefit the most from the unit of account, means of payment and store of value services provided by a common currencyand from stabilizing the price of the domestic currency in terms of foreign exchange. We measure size as the log of the product of real GDP in U.S. dollars of the two countries (lrgdp). In addition, we include openness, the arithmetic average of the total trade/GNP ratios of the two countries (open), as a second proxy for the transactions costs associated with a fluctuating domestic currency, as suggested by McKinnon (1963) .
Finally, we add a vector of RTA variables that equal unity when the two partner countries are both members of the same regional arrangement, and zero otherwise.
Previous work has constructed this variable in two ways. Frankel (1997) limits his measure to the five most important RTAs. Rose (2000) , on the other hand, considers also a number of smaller RTAs. (It turns out to make a difference how this variable is constructed, as we shall see below.) In some specifications we constrain the effects of all RTAs to be equal (note, however, that the variable in question continues to equal unity only if both partner countries belong to the same RTA), while in other specifications we allow different effects of different RTAs. We also allow for trade diversion by including a vector of RTA diversion variables that equal unity when one of the two partner countries is a member of a regional arrangement, and zero otherwise A number of issues arise when attempting to estimate this model. a) There is the question of whether to consider nominal or real exchange rate variability. It is nominal variability that is arguably influenced by the authorities but real variability that matters for the economic and political consequences. Fortunately, we obtain very similar results for both dependent variables. 16 In what follows we report results for the nominal exchange rate, since the nominal rate is the focus of policy discussions. b) There is the fact that the dependent variable (sdce), the five year centered moving average of the standard deviation of the change in the log nominal exchange rate is truncated at zero and that a substantial number of observations are heaped on that value. We therefore estimated the relationship using both a linear model and a Tobit model. The estimated coefficients were virtually identical, and since the linear model allows us to handle endogeneity and display correct standard errors, we show only these results henceforth. 17 c) There is the fact that bilateral trade is endogenous and that it is affected by participation in an RTA and, potentially, following earlier arguments, by the variability of the exchange rate. 18 We address this by simultaneously estimating a gravity model of bilateral trade. The volume of trade (ltrade) is a function of the standard deviation of the exchange rate (sdce), the dependent variable in our exchange rate equation, which is therefore treated as simultaneously determined, the standard arguments of the gravity model (the size of the countries, distance, contiguity, and common language), and the same vector of RTA variables included in our exchange rate variability regressions.
Using the arguments of this trade equation as instruments in our exchange rate equation addresses the possibility of reverse causality -that trade is affected by exchange rate volatility. 19 d) There is the possibility that the consequences for exchange rate policy of an RTA will depend not just on the volume but also the structure of trade. This is suggested by the comparison of Europe and NAFTA in Section 1 above. Kenen (1969) similarly suggests that the attractiveness of exchange rate stabilization and monetary unification will depend on the (dis)similarity of the trade structures of the potential partners. 20 In our 17 Tobit two-stage results with uncorrected standard errors are available from the authors upon request. 18 In addition, there is the possibility that the decision to join an RTA is endogenous, as argued by Baier and Bergstrand (2002) . Addressing this possibility would be complex, since we are already dealing with a system of equations. We leave this extension to future work. 19 As always, the estimates are only as reliable as the instruments. In practice, the measure of business cycle conformance and openness included in the exchange rate equation are the instruments for exchange rates in the trade equation, while distance, contiguity, common language, and time and country dummies are the instruments for bilateral trade in the exchange rate equation. 20 He had in mind that when countries specialize in the production of distinct goods, the prices of which are affected very differently by disturbances, asymmetric shocks are more likely, increasing the attractions of an independent monetary policy and a fluctuating exchange rate. We have in mind that when countries specialize in the production of distinct goods, exchange rate fluctuations lead to less substitution between analysis of exchange rate variability, we therefore consider the structure as well as the volume of trade using a measure of trade dissimilarity (dissim). e) Finally, there is the fact that this framework addresses trade, largely to the exclusion of financial flows. We address this limitation below. 
Baseline Results
The baseline results in Table 1 are consistent with the theory of optimum currency areas.
In the gravity model regressions, trade increases with size, common border and common language and falls with distance and exchange rate volatility, as expected. In the exchange-rate-volatility regressions, volatility rises with the dispersion of business cycles and economic size and falls with the volume of bilateral trade, again as expected. There is them, placing less pressure on competitiveness, net exports and profitability. Thus, while the mechanisms are different, the implications are the same. 21 The appendix provides more precise definitions of the variables contained in our data set. no evidence that more open economies have more stable rates, controlling for size (which is also related to the propensity to trade). 22 The negative coefficient on the volume of bilateral trade in the exchange rate equation is worth further attention, since it would be convenient to be able to argue that an RTA that stimulates bilateral trade naturally produces more stable bilateral rates. The coefficient in question is robust and well determined. (Recall that we have controlled for the possibility of reverse causality running from exchange rate volatility to trade.) One can think of several economic mechanisms through which trade would produce more stable exchange rates; for example, it could encourage foreign-exchange-market transactions, resulting in more liquid and stable currency markets. 23 Frankel and Rose (1998) , in a related analysis, show that more bilateral trade leads to more synchronized business cycles in the two partner countries. The question, for present purposes, is whether the effect in question is large or small. We return to this below.
Of particular interest are the coefficients on the RTAs. In the gravity model, the results in columns 1 and 2 are consistent with those of previous investigators. Rose's comprehensive RTA measure generates a significant positive coefficient, suggesting that RTAs are trade creating. In contrast, the more selective Frankel measure, which is limited to the five principal RTAs, generates a negative coefficient; this is the same result as in Frankel (1997) .
Further disaggregation may help to explain this contrast. When we disaggregate the five large RTAs (Table 1 , column 3), we find that the negative effect (evidence that participation in an RTA reduces trade) is driven by the EU. 24 However, this negative coefficient is eliminated (it becomes statistically indistinguishable from zero) when we add a vector of trade diversion variables for cases where one member of a country pair but not the other belongs to a particular RTA. We include this vector of trade diversion variables in all of the specifications that follow. The results also appear to vary across developed and developing country subsamples. In the OECD regressions (columns 4-6), RTAs appear to weakly encourage trade, but the impact in the FTAA subsample (columns 7-9) is larger. FTAA trade appears to be more sensitive to distance and borders than OECD trade, as one might expect if transport infrastructure is weaker in the developing world. FTAA trade, in contrast, seems less sensitive to exchange rate volatility.
Our main interest is in the exchange rate regression, with trade now treated as endogenous. Here we find sharply different effects of different regional arrangements.
The RTA coefficient, which should now be interpreted as capturing non-trade ("political") effects since we are controlling for trade separately, is uniformly positive, and significantly so when we use the comprehensive Rose measure. In apparent contradiction of pure OCA logic, the formation of RTAs has evidently been associated with increased exchange rate volatility. This impact has not been uniform, however. The coefficient is significantly negative for the EU, and it is also significantly negative for NAFTA when we limit the sample to OECD countries. In contrast, we obtain a large and positive coefficient for Mercosur, both in the full sample and the FTAA sample. 25 Evidently, the Mercosur free trade area has created political pressures that have done little to promote and, if anything, have obstructed monetary cooperation. This is no surprise in light of the discussion in Section 1 of Mercosur's checkered history. But these political effects may not be the entire story, since Mercosur also created trade and hence presumably generated economic pressure for monetary cooperation. Which influence mattered more?
For some regions like the EU, both the expansion of intra-RTA trade and RTA- While this effect is not inconsequential, the product of the two terms is small (-0.09). The direct effect on exchange rate variability (the "political" effect, which captures all other reasons why exchange rate variability may be larger or smaller in a particular region or FTAA) is +0.71 for the Mercosur countries. The direct effect is thus seven times the size of the indirect effect: the trade channel is swamped by the "political" channel. 26 It would be attention-getting to be able to argue that the additional trade generated by participation in an RTA works to stabilize exchange rates. We find some evidence to this effect, since more bilateral trade is consistently associated with less bilateral exchange rate volatility, ceteris paribus. But this channel is swamped by other factors.
For Mercosur, those other factors work in the direction of greater volatility.
Extensions
In Table 2 we consider extensions of the basic model, restricting our attention to the full sample of data due to space constraints. We focus on the exchange rate volatility equation, maintaining the same first-stage gravity equation estimated in Table 1 , Regression 3. The results reinforce our conclusion that NAFTA and especially Mercosur have been associated with pressure for less exchange rate stabilization than was seen in the EU project.
In Regression 1 we add a variable measuring the similarity in the composition of exports (dissim), which has some additional effect on reducing the volatility of exchange rates over and above its association with the volume of trade. 27 Looking at the RTA dummies, we see that this extension now shows the EU discouraging trade but encouraging exchange rate coordination (where the second effect was insignificantly different from zero for the full sample in Table 1) , providing stronger support than before for the hypothesis that the political channel played an important role in EMU. 28 In contrast, the effects of NAFTA are unchanged from before. NAFTA still appears to generate modest trade but statistically insignificant exchange-rate coordination effects, as if the tendency for more extensive trade links to create economic pressure for exchange rate stabilization dominate political influences, operating in either direction.
Mercosur appears to operate very differently from the EU, producing significantly more trade but also significantly more exchange rate volatility.
In Regressions 2 through 4 we add financial variables to our exchange rate volatility equation in order to address the possibility that finance as well as trade shapes 27 We did not find a significant association between dissim and ltrade in the gravity equation, leading us to omit this variable from our specification and retain the Table 1 gravity model for further analysis. 28 See the literature inspired by Frankel and Rose (1998) , where the synchronicity of business cycles and not the volatility of exchange rates is the dependent variable. In that context, Shin and Wang (2002) find that the similarity of exports (intra-industry trade in particular) is positively associated with business cycle coherence. policies toward the exchange rate. One could imagine, for example, that countries with large amounts of short-term debt find it more difficult to hold the exchange rate stable since they are less able to raise interest rates to prevent the exchange rate from weakening. At the same time, countries with large amounts of debt may have a stronger desire to stabilize the exchange rate in order to avoid destabilizing balance-sheet effects, especially when much of the debt in question is denominated in foreign currency (the "fear of floating" syndrome). 29 We therefore added to the exchange rate equation the external debt/GNP ratio and the short-term/total external debt ratio, as tabulated by the World Bank. 30 In Regression 2, for the sample of countries and years for which both variables are available (we do not have data on short-term debt for OECD countries), it appears that more heavily indebted countries and countries with larger shares of short-term obligations in total external debt have more volatile exchange rates. 31 We are able to expand the sample to include the OECD countries by dropping short-term debt, as in Regression 3. 32 Doing so changed none of the other results. Alternatively, we were able to gather foreign debt as a share of 29 For theory and evidence to this effect, see Hausmann et al. (1999) . Note further that in order to draw implications from these arguments for the connections between the formation of a free trade agreement and exchange rate volatility, it is also necessary to have views of how an RTA will affect these financial variables. Some will argue that an RTA that encourages countries to trade more heavily with one another will also encourage them to engage in more cross-border investment with one another, and vice versa. There is some limited evidence of this in the literature on the determinants of direct foreign investment (see for example Frankel 1997) , but little evidence of which we are aware on the connections between trade and portfolio capital flows. Casual observations suggests no single pattern: whereas regional integration in Europe has significantly stimulated the volume of cross-border capital flows, analogous initiatives in Asia have had much more limited financial effects (Eichengreen and Park 2002) .. 30 Both variables are taken from the World Bank's World Development Indicators CD-ROM. Note that the sample size drops significantly when we add this variable. Ideally, one would also want a measure of the currency denomination of the debt, but such information is not readily available. 31 There are some interesting contrasts between the results for the full sample and the potential members of an FTAA. While total indebtedness is associated with more variable exchange rates in both instances, the effect of a shorter maturity structure is negative in the FTAA subsample, reversing the full sample finding. Conceivably, short-term debt could be disproportionately denominated in foreign currency, heightening the risk of destabilizing balance-sheet effects if the exchange rate is allowed to move, but the data do not permit one do to more than speculate about this possibility. 32 And adding additional data on total debt/GNP from the OECD's Main Economic Indicators. total debt from IMF sources. The results suggest that countries with larger shares of foreign debt have more volatile exchange rates, other things equal. 33 But our key finding, that while more bilateral trade encourages exchange-rate stabilization, the political effects of RTA participation do not, at least in the Western Hemisphere, is unaffected by these extensions. True, the Mercosur dummy is somewhat smaller in these regressions, around +0.5 compared +0.7 in Table 1 , suggesting that considerations relating to trade structure, multilateral resistance, and debt can explain some part of the Mercosur countries' unusually high levels of exchange rate variability. But most of that additional variability remains unexplained.
In Regression 4, we entertain the possibility that Europe is different because it is made up of a number of relatively large, similarly-sized economies well positioned to negotiate symmetrical arrangements to stabilize their exchange rates. It has been hypothesized that a number of countries of roughly comparable size will have substantial effects on one another; hence that they will tend to gain significantly from coordinating. 34 The ancillary hypothesis, informed by European experience, is that symmetrical forms of coordination to which both countries contribute are more likely to produce stable rates than asymmetric arrangements in which the small country is forced to unilaterally accept the monetary policy dictates of its larger neighbor. We therefore added to our specification an asymmetry-of-size variable (gdpsize), defined as the absolute value of the difference in GDP between the two countries, normalized by the average of their two GDPs. 33 Interestingly, that positive and significant coefficient goes to zero for the FTAA subsample. 34 We owe this idea to Andrés Velasco.
Contrary to the hypothesis, this variable enters with a negative coefficient: two countries are more likely to have a relatively stable bilateral rate when one is much larger than the other. It could be objected that the symmetry-leads-to-stability argument holds only for large countries and not small ones; we therefore constructed an alternative measure by multiplying the previous variable by average size of the two countries. 35 Again, the resulting variable entered negatively, contrary to the null; countries of similar size appear less likely to stabilize their bilateral rates, ceteris paribus. But the key point is that none of our other results was substantively affected by this extension.
What Exchange Rate Regime for the Western Hemisphere?
None of the preceding disputes that exchange rate volatility can be a problem for a regional arrangement -that it may negatively affect trade and, by conferring an arbitrary and capricious competitive disadvantage on some national producers, that it may provoke a protectionist backlash against liberalization. It would be convenient to be able to argue, building on the observation that more open economies prefer more stable currencies, that additional trade automatically produces additional exchange rate stability, but our results suggest that the magnitude of this effect is small. It would be convenient were greater trade within the region to create political pressure for exchange rate stabilization, but our results suggest that there can be a gap between aspiration and realization. To be sure, in Europe the aspiration to limit exchange rate flexibility has been realized by a series of monetary arrangements, culminating in EMU, which significantly reduced exchange rate volatility over and above what might have been predicted on the basis of the volume of trade. In NAFTA, in contrast, there is little evidence of an analogous effect. Among the Mercosur countries, any such aspiration has been frustrated: exchange rates have been consistently more volatile, not less, than the volume of intra-regional trade and other factors would lead one to expect.
What can the FTAA countries do about this? There is a literature on institutions and practices for macroeconomic coordination suggesting initiatives for better harmonizing macroeconomic policies and outcomes with the goal of stabilizing bilateral rates. Countries can agree to regular meetings and procedures for exchanging information on economic conditions and objectives; this will minimize the danger that they will pursue inconsistent policies because they hold inconsistent assumptions. 36 They can engage in policy adjustments that may be undesirable in isolation but are mutually advantageous when undertaken simultaneously. They can appeal to international pressure for policy reforms that meet political resistance at home. And they can extend financial support to partner currencies that come under speculative pressure.
We are skeptical that these approaches to policy coordination would be productive in the FTAA context. Different information sets hardly seem like the main reason why policy inputs and macroeconomic outputs (such as the movement of exchange rates) differ so sharply across the countries of the Southern Cone and the Western Hemisphere. There already exist mechanisms for information sharing and assessment at the multilateral and regional levels, including IMF surveillance, IDB projections, and ELCA forecasts. The information-exchange rationale for international policy coordination is discussed in Meyer et al. (2002) . and procedures for the convergence of debts, deficits, and levels of public debt. 37 Governments created a High Level Macroeconomic Monitoring Group made up of senior officials from ministries of finance and central banks (analogous to the EU's Economic and Financial Committee) to monitor macroeconomic developments in member countries and advance proposals for policy coordination. The Andean countries have developed similar arrangements. But little has come of all this. The problem is not inadequate institutionalization, in other words; it is the lack of a political and economic context in which those institutions can operate effectively or, simply put, lack of will. As Buti and Giudice (2002, p. 30 ) put it, "given the lack of discernible penalties and rewards, it is unclear how the supra-national dimension could enhance the incentives to abide by the agreed rules."
Nor do we think that the problem in Mercosur has been or that in an FTAA it would be the inability of the participating countries to engage in mutually advantageous policy trades. The reason that Argentina was unwilling to follow a tighter fiscal policy in 2001 was not Brazil's unwillingness to follow a looser monetary policy, or vice versa. 38 In the context of an FTAA, meaningful policy trades would presumably involve adjustments in U.S. monetary policy in return for adjustments in fiscal policy involving much of Latin America. But, while the Fed may at times take international conditions into account when taking interest rate decisions, this is hardly a dominant consideration.
Nor it is easy to imagine circumstances in which it would be heavily influenced by events in Latin America only. 37 We provide more details on these targets below. 38 Although one can imagine an argument that modest policy adjustments in these directions would have benefited both countries. The argument would be that tighter fiscal policy in Argentina would have bolstered investor confidence in both countries, while looser monetary policy in Brazil would have stimulated aggregate demand throughout the region.
While mechanisms for exerting peer pressure are better developed in Europe than in the Western Hemisphere, even there their efficacy has been limited. Europe has negotiated an international treaty (the Maastricht Treaty, or Treaty of European Union) that makes explicit provision for mutual surveillance. It benefits from the existence of an international institution, the European Commission, which can undertake central monitoring and act as fair broker. Yet, in the summer of 2002, by appealing to another EU institution (the Council of Ministers, made up of national heads of state), France and Germany were able to rebuff the Commission's attempts to send letters to their governments warning of excessive budget deficits, as provided for under the terms of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). The point is not that peer pressure is impossible, but rather that it is only one, and often a minor, factor affecting domestic policy formulation. 39 Even in Europe, where mechanisms for applying it are highly developed and heavily institutionalized, it is not always effective. Governments, especially those of consequential countries with political leverage, can resist its application. To put the point another way, if the pressure applied by the U.S. government, the IMF, and the markets for Argentina to get its fiscal house in order did not suffice in 1998-2001, it is hard to imagine that a regional surveillance exercise, conducted under the aegis of Mercosur or an FTAA, would be significantly more effectual. 40 Finally, there is the argument for financial supports in the context of an RTA.
These were famously provided in Europe through of the Short-Term and Very-Short-39 Some European observers would not reach equally pessimistic conclusions about the efficacy of mutual surveillance. See for example Buti and Giudice (2002) . But even they would acknowledge that "it is not clear whether the political economy factors which underpinned the success of Maastricht consolidation can be recreated in Latin America" (p. 1). 40 NAFTA's experience is consistent with this view. In fact, U.S. Treasury and Federal Reserve Board officials discussed the need for a standing consultative mechanism to anticipate exchange rate problems within the RTA already in 1993, and soon thereafter they launched the North American Framework Agreement and North American Financial Group with Canada (see DeLong and Eichengreen 2002) . Suffice it to say that neither mechanism played much a role in heading off the Mexican crisis or managing its consequences. But there are reasons to doubt that countries with strong currencies and ample reserves will really be prepared to offer extensive support to their weak currency counterparts under the terms of such arrangements. They will do so only if they are confident that their resources will not be squandered -only if they are assured that the obligation to intervene is accompanied by surveillance capable of anticipating and heading off crises, and only if it is accompanied by conditionality that leads to strong adjustment in the crisis country which will reassure the markets and maximize the likelihood of prompt repayment of any swaps. Otherwise, strong-currency countries will be unlikely to commit significant resources to supporting weak regional currencies, statutory commitments to do so or not. Even in Europe, where the commitment to collective currency pegs was exceptionally strong, mutual surveillance and conditionality were less than effective, resulting in limits on the extent of actual support. Germany obtained an opt out from the provision of the EMS Articles of Agreement obliging it to intervene without limit in support of its partners, reflecting fears of the costs of unlimited interventions and what unlimited support might imply for its creditworthiness.
Participants in the Asian Swap Arrangement could similarly opt out of that arrangement. 41 Under the Chiang Mai Initiative activation of the swap is similarly at the discretion of the lender. It is not an unconditional commitment.
The essence of the matter is that governments are no more inclined than commercial banks to lend freely and unconditionally. Market participants, conscious of this reluctance to lend freely, are unlikely to be deterred from attacking weak currencies by promises of official support. An international lender of last resort who lends freely to support weak currencies remains a pipe dream in a world of sovereign states; it is a thin reed on which to hang hopes of exchange rate stabilization, in the Western Hemisphere or elsewhere. And if strong conditions have to be attached to international loans, both the lenders and borrowers are likely to prefer having these formulated by a third party like the IMF rather than by, say, the U.S. government, which would then become the focus of populist vitriol. If there is going to be outside support for exchange rates, in other words, it is more likely to come from the multilaterals rather than bilaterally in the context of an
RTA. 42
The bottom line is that neither Mercosur nor an FTAA is likely to provide a platform for a collective currency stabilization agreement. Financial supports will remain limited. And, if there is one lesson of recent experience, it is that currency bands and pegs are fragile and crisis prone in an environment of open capital markets, democratic politics, and limited multilateral support -which is precisely the environment in which exchange rate policy will be formulated in the Western Hemisphere. 41 Opting out in the event of "exceptional financial circumstances" was permitted from the inception of the ASA, and in 1992 the right to opt out became effectively unlimited. 42 It could be argued that Mercosur countries might be more willing to provide financial support to one another precisely in order to free themselves from the scrutiny of the IMF. Thus, there were suggestions in Argentina in 2001 of perhaps obtaining financial assistance from Brazil. But, to the extent that the various economies of the Southern Cone tend to come under market pressure at the same time (as when the U.S. raises interest rates and capital flows to emerging markets dry up), this is unlikely to be a solution. There is also the fact that Brazil is several times larger than the other Mercosur countries combined, making it hard to see how it could be effectively supported by its partners (Machinea 2002) . Much as we would like to avoid it, we should probably say a few words about the idea of a monetary union for Mercosur (or other RTAs) or a single currency for the Western Hemisphere. Those words can be quite few: there is no indication that the United States would be prepared to give Canada, Mexico, and other countries in the hemisphere seats on the Federal Reserve Board, much less abolish the Fed in favor of a hemispheric central bank. However appealing this idea may be to economic theorists, we regard it as social science fiction. 43 It is easier to imagine a single currency for Mercosur, but only slightly. As noted in our introduction, European monetary integration is part of a larger process of political integration. Countries like Germany were prepared to countenance the additional uncertainty about future monetary policy associated with the transition from the Bundesbank to the ECB because of the value they attached to the larger European project. In addition, there exist in Europe transnational institutions of collective governance like the European Parliament to hold the ECB accountable for its actions and to lend political legitimacy to the single monetary policy. Suffice it to say that none of these conditions prevails in the Western Hemisphere, nor will any time soon.
Small countries like Ecuador and El

Economic Gaps Versus Political Gaps
One way of illustrating the importance of the economic versus political origins of monetary coordination is to examine the predictions of our model. Table 2 . Box plots summarize the distribution of fitted values for the exchange rate volatility measure. We divide the sample into the five major RTA zones and other pairs. The Western Hemisphere stands out: compared to the rest of the world, and controlling for trade and other economic factors, the impact of RTAs is definitely not to reduce exchange rate volatility (as in the case of NAFTA) and may even increase it (as in the case of Mercosur). Monetary noncooperation is the rule in the FTAA zone. In contrast, ASEAN and ANZCER seem to have almost as much preference for fixing as the EU, gauged from of the distribution of fitted values. 44 Counterfactual exercises can show exactly how important political factors are in the FTAA zone as an obstacle to monetary coordination. Imagine that we could impose the EU's level of "political willingness" to cooperate on the Mercosur countries. We compute this by adding the difference between the EU and Mercosur terms to the fitted values. The new implied distribution of exchange rate volatilities is then shown in the box plots labeled "Mercosur (CF-EU)." 45 The implications are clear: the failure to engage in monetary cooperation in Mercosur is not obviously a function of economic variables.
The countries do not have unusual size, trade, composition, or other economic characteristics that militate against monetary cooperation; in this respect they are reasonably similar to the EU. Rather, the sources of the cooperation deficit lie elsewhere. This is not to say that monetary cooperation, even monetary union, is impossible except in Europe. Europe was special in that political will supplemented compelling economic reasons for coordination. Other regions may be following a similar path, although none of them is as far along that path as Europe is today. It may be possible to envisage a future where the FTAA goes down that path as well, although doing so takes some imagination. For the present, in any case, there is little sign of the necessary will. 44 On this basis we might conclude that discussions of monetary cooperation -even monetary unificationin those regions may not be pie in the sky, since the "political" effects do not offset, and if anything support, the case for coordination. But such is not true, in any case, of the potential members of an FTAA. 45 CF refers to counterfactual.
A Modest Proposal
Having ruled out alternatives for cooperation ad seriatim, we are led to conclude that floating exchange rates in the Western Hemisphere are here to stay in the medium term.
This conclusion may not be comfortably reconciled with the desire for more extensive trade, but it is the reality.
Is the implication a council of despair -that exchange rate instability will continue to slow efforts to promote regional trade liberalization? Not necessarily. An exchange rate that adjusts smoothly to differences in national economic conditions can be part of the solution rather than part of the problem. In particular, gradual adjustments that eliminate disequilibria smoothly are preferable to discrete, disruptive changes of formerly pegged rates precipitated by crises. We now argue that the more widespread adoption of inflation targeting in the region will go some way toward ensuring such adjustment and thereby limiting exchange rate tensions. 46 The argument, in a nutshell, is that a credible policy of inflation targeting provides a nominal anchor for expectations and that, with an anchor for expectations, exchange rates will settle down. Market participants will no longer have reason to believe that inflation today is a leading indicator of inflation tomorrow, because the authorities have explicitly committed to low inflation, because they will pay a political price if they miss that target, and because they will have to provide an explanation for any passing failure. 47 Speculation in the foreign exchange market will become stabilizing rather than destabilizing.
The association between exchange rate stability and inflation targeting has not been analyzed much previously. The one previous study of which we are aware, by Kuttner and Posen (2001) , uses data for 41 developing and emerging-market economies, relating measures of exchange rate volatility to whether or not a country targets inflation (and to measures of central bank autonomy and the declared exchange rate regime).
While inflation targeters display lower levels of exchange rate volatility (as measured, alternatively, by the standard deviation of the exchange rate, its kurtosis, and various measures of its range), the differences are not statistically significant.
To marshal additional evidence, we added dummy variables for whether countries target inflation to our exchange rate volatility regressions, as shown in Table 3 . We used the comprehensive tabulation of inflation targeting around the world from Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001) to construct two variables: one that equals unity when one of two partner countries targets inflation, and another that equals unity when both countries have adopted this monetary regime. Alternatively, we used the J. P. Morgan classification.
Since inflation targeting is one possible alternative to attempting to peg the exchange rate (though it is not the only one -another alternative is to resist the temptation to articulate an explicit monetary policy operating strategy), we controlled for the choice of exchange rate regime when testing for the effects of this inflation-targeting variable.
Of course, the decision to target inflation may be endogenous. In particular, the literature on inflation targeting in open economies points out that countries with more volatile exchange rates may find it more difficult to inflation target because, inter alia, the domestic price level will be more difficult to forecast and exchange rate fluctuations will decisions taken by the central bank. Institutionalizing the commitment to price stability lends credibility to that objective and gives the central bank the independence needed to pursue it. Mechanisms for accountability make this pursuit politically acceptable and impose costs on central banks that are incompetent or behave opportunistically. Announcing a target for inflation and articulating the basis for the central bank's decisions allows these mechanisms to operate. have disruptive output effects. 48 In addition, countries with deeper financial markets, less short-term debt, and a history of policy transparency are more likely to inflation target (transparency being the sine qua non of inflation targeting). Thus, there is the danger that countries with these characteristics may both prefer to inflation target and enjoy more stable exchange rates, but that the causal connection between inflation targeting and exchange rate stability is weak. We therefore instrumented our dummy variables for inflation targeting using a first-stage probit regression, where the independent variables were the M2/GNP ratio as (a measure of financial depth), the short-term debt/GNP ratio, and Transparency International's measure of transparency and corruption. The results are suggestive: we find that countries that target inflation have significantly less volatile exchange rates, even after controlling for a variety of other economic and financial determinants of realized volatility and even after adjusting for the endogeneity of the regime. 49 One interpretation of these results is that inflation targeting is a better way of delivering relatively low levels of exchange rate instability, ex post, than pegging the nominal rate. Pegs, no matter how hard, have historically had a tendency to collapse, unleashing pent-up volatility. Our results thus suggest that a credible agreement by FTAA partners to move to inflation targeting (and perhaps to agree on a common inflation target) may go some way toward limiting the tension between floating exchange rates and the pursuit of regional trade liberalization.
This last sentence includes two important qualifications. The first piece of critical wording is "some way." Although the coefficient on the Mercosur dummy is reduced in 48 A review of reviews on open economy inflation targeting is Eichengreen (2001) . 49 Volatility is also less if both countries inflation target. One could object that in a world of medium-run purchasing power parity (PPP), targeting one nominal variable like the inflation rate is no different than targeting another like the exchange rate. However, this is not a tautology at shorter horizons, and our exchange rate measure uses a five-year window, a span short enough to allow ample deviations from PPP. The older literature on inflation targeting (e.g. Eichengreen, Masson, Savastano and Sharma 1999) points to central bank independence and the absence of chronic budget deficits as key prerequisites for credible inflation targeting. If the central bank is not independent, it will not be able to credibly subordinate other goals to the pursuit of low inflation. And if chronic budget deficits are a problem, the country will eventually become subject to unpleasant monetary arithmetic. Public-sector deficits will have to be monetized by the central bank to avert the inevitable funding crisis, whether the central 50 There is also one other reason to worry about the extent to which an optimistic outlook on inflation targeting and exchange rate volatility can be attached to the results in Table 3 . Recall that this option is being considered in opposition to a hard peg solution, and imagine a pair of current FTAA member suffering from acute "fear of floating," one of which is thinking of inflation targeting. The country would gain a modest amount of stability if they target (the coefficient is about -0.1), but they will also experience a change in exchange rate regime that might offset this gain, according to the coefficient on the Reinhart-Rogoff measure (moving from a peg = 1 to a float = 4 would offset half of the inflation target benefits, if we multiply +3 by 0.04 and divide by 2; though moving to intermediate regimes might not). The conceptual difficulty here is that pegging is an ER based regime, but floating is not a "regime" at all, and more accurate specification of the objective function (such as IT) is needed, as Guillermo Calvo and others have frequently pointed out. Our IT measures capture this in some way, but we admit this only scratches the surface of the tradeoff between ER and IT based stabilization plans. 51 Others worry that inflation targeting in Brazil may have collapsed in a burst of inflation between the time of writing and the publication of this volume. bank likes it -and is independent -or not. Thus, Latin American countries in which these prerequisites are absent are unlikely to be able to inflation target. Monetary autonomy will therefore translate into relatively high levels of exchange rate instability that will be difficult to reconcile with the desire for regional trade liberalization.
The potential for a funding crisis perhaps warrants the most attention. In many recent crises, the problem has been not simply the size of deficits but the structure of the debt. In Brazil, in particular, high levels of short-term debt meant that if investors refused to roll over the government's maturing obligations except at very high interest rates, the debt burden might quickly become unsustainable, even in the face of very impressive primary budget surpluses. And, if the central bank refused to monetize the debt, the government might be forced into default, which would wreak havoc with bank balance sheets and force the central bank to engage in lender of last resort intervention, with inflationary consequences. See Argentina; see also the crises of the 1890s in the same two countries.
We can think of this as the "Fiscal Dominance Mark II" critique of inflation targeting. Credible inflation targeting requires not just the absence of chronic deficits (the absence of "Fiscal Dominance Mark I") but also success at lengthening the maturity structure of the domestic debt and delinking it from exchange rates and short-term interest rates, so that shocks to confidence cannot cause a debt run-off (the absence of "Fiscal Dominance Mark II"). Otherwise, the reduction in exchange rate volatility delivered by the authorities' embrace of inflation targeting may be no more than a temporary blessing. Goldstein (2002) has described the menu of policies that countries should follow in order to be free of "Fiscal Dominance Mark II." They should to manage the maturity and currency composition of the public debt, resisting the temptation to limit short-run funding costs by incurring short-term, foreign-currency denominated debt that will come back to bite them in the long run. They need to regulate the banking system to limit currency mismatches on commercial bank balance sheets. They may need to use tax and regulatory policies to prevent the banks from funding themselves in dollars and simply passing that exposure on to the corporate sector, which will be thrust into bankruptcy when the exchange rate depreciates, in turn bringing the banks tumbling down. With careful pursuit of such policies, it is argued, inflation targeting will become widely feasible in Latin America.
The limitation of this prescription is that it ignores the role of history in shaping monetary conditions. In this respect Argentina and Uruguay, where there were no capital controls and dollar-denominated bank accounts are prevalent, may be very different from Brazil and Chile, where more restrictive policies toward the current account have bequeathed a less difficult environment for inflation targeting. Pesification can conveniently remove the legacy of earlier policies, but only by dealing a sharp blow to confidence, the one and same variable that inflation targeting is designed to enhance.
The question is whether high levels of liability dollarization, inherited from the past, merely complicate the conduct of inflation targeting, requiring the central bank to perhaps attach a higher weight to the exchange rate (whose depreciation not only signals future inflation, as in any other open economy, but also threatens destabilizing balancesheet effects, which will depress output at the same time inflation accelerates). Or does the liability-dollarization problem in fact render open-economy inflation targeting infeasible? Does it amplify the destabilizing effects of exchange-rate fluctuations so dramatically that the authorities cannot permit the exchange rate to move at all, in which case they might as well dollarize de jure as well as de facto? Or is this extreme case as rare as it is extreme: are there still some advantages of exchange rate flexibility and, by implication, of inflation targeting in all but the most highly dollarized economies? The advocates of this last position point to Peru, a highly dollarized economy that nonetheless has been able to reap benefits from floating-cum-inflation targeting and suggest hopefully that even other highly dollarized Latin American countries will be able to follow its example (see Berg, Borensztein and Mauro 2002) .
Many extensions of our analysis are clearly possible; the few we have considered leave our central results unchanged. One would address the objection that our results fail to control adequately for the dollarization problem just noted: to address this we added the M2/GDP ratio to the regressions of Table 4 . 52 The results were not significantly altered; although the M2 ratio had a negative and significant coefficient (indicating that high liability dollarization and low financial depth are associated with greater exchange rate volatility, as expected), the coefficients on the RTAs barely budged, and the Mercosur politics dummy remained highly significant. 53 Another potential objection is that Mercosur is still a young RTA compared to, inter alia, the EU. Perhaps RTAs deliver more exchange rate stability after some years than at inception. To test this we included a dummy variable that equaled unity during the first five years of an RTA agreement. Immature RTAs did have significantly higher exchange rate volatility in our sample (the coefficient on the new dummy variable was 0.3), but the Mercosur dummy remained around 0.36 and statistically significant at the 99 per cent confidence level.
Lastly, it might be argued that all we are doing is capturing the propensity of certain countries to experience exchange rate crises that are associated with unusually high levels of volatility. Perhaps, leaving these crisis periods aside, Mercosur has been able to avoid outlandish exchange rate volatility, and what we have really pointed out is the need to simply understand the political economy of the crisis problem in these countries. To address this possibility, we excluded observations with very high volatility.
When we dropped observations for which sdce > 2, little changed. When we excluded all observations for which sdce > 1, the key results were actually strengthened. While the coefficient on the Mercosur dummy fell from 0.4 to 0.1, it was still highly significant at standard confidence levels. In addition, in this truncated sample the negative coefficients on the two inflation targeting variables were both significant at the 99 per cent confidence level (and negative as before). Evidently, the tendency for inflation targeting to better reconcile monetary autonomy with exchange rate volatility does not hinge on the contrast with a few crisis prone countries during episodes of highly unstable exchange rates, a subsample that does not begin to satisfy the preconditions for successful inflation targeting; it obtains also when these crisis episodes are omitted and the sample is limited to countries with reasonably stable exchange rates.
Conclusion
Our short run diagnosis, then, is that floating is here to stay in the Western Hemisphere, although dollarization remains a wildcard, mainly for small countries such as those of Central America with especially heavy dependence on trade with the United States. If yearnings for an "ever closer" FTAA develop over time (the EU-politics counterfactual), then the monetary calculus could change. On purely economic grounds, there is no reason why the Western Hemisphere should be more or less inclined toward monetary union than Western Europe. 54 The question is how to get there. But looking to Europe now as a 54 We are not alone in drawing this inference. See also Rogoff (2002) , who writes: "Since 1945, the number of currencies in the world has increased roughly twofold, almost proportionately to the number of model would be a mistake. Our findings suggest that Europe's single market was a stepping stone to monetary union because of a special constellation of political forces that created an overwhelming desire for exchange rate coordination and monetary union. This desire was far in excess of any other countries' wish for exchange rate stability based on economic criteria alone.
There is little in these results to suggest that other RTAs possess attributes rendering them similarly ripe for monetary coordination. 55 And, NAFTA and Mercosur, which include the larger economies in the Western Hemisphere, show the least inclination in these matters. The best that can be hoped for in the short-run is better individually-managed monetary policies that credibly deliver improved exchange rate stability, be it by inflation targeting or other means.
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